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The Roll of H uman Nature in Philosophy of Education
Ora D. Lovell
The role of human nature in educational philosophy is
apparent. The educator can not pursue his task at any great
lengthuntil he is brought face to face with the problem of human
nature. From the sources used for this paper the writer be
came increasingly aware of the educator's concern over the
problem of human nature. It is evident that we need to know
more about the human material of the classroom represented
by the children and youth of our country. Where shall we go
to secure this information? Some would respond by telling us
to turn to the theological divines of both the past and present.
Following their advice we quickly discover no united voice
among these spokesmen for Christ and the Church. Different
positions have not only divided them into separate schools of
thought, but various and diverse opinions exist within each
school. In the light of this we are instructed by others to look
to educational philosophy. One does not pursue his study of
this field far until he discovers a similar situation to that
revealed by his study of theology . In the books read in prepa
ration for writing this paper educational philosophy was
divided into separate schools of thought and practice; each
school is certain of the position held and is quick to criticize
other schools. Much of the disagreement among both theo
logians and educators centers upon the question of human
nature. Serious thought and careful study are indeed necessary
in the light of this picture; this is the concern of Brubacher:
The educator and especially the educational
philosopher must not only know the nature of the
world in which we live and learn, but he must also
know the generic traits of the human learner. 'What
is man that Thou art mindful of him?' cried the
ancient Hebrew prophet. This question is as urgent
today as it ever has been. The teacher must have
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an answer to it as well as the prophet.-^
Shelton Smith, having concern over the position of the radical
liberal, expresses a view quite similar to that of Brubacher.
Every period of acute social crises has had the
effect, sooner or later, of centering attention upon
the fundamental question ofman' s nature and destiny .
The present is no exception to the rule. With the
decay of liberal civilization, the rise of new political
faiths, and the radical shift in values�all of which
mark what Berdyaev has called the 'end of our
time'�the irrepressible question re-emerges, What
is man? The new political faiths that have arisen
since the firstWorld War have given answers to this
question which essentially contradict the Christian
understanding of man. In this there is raised a
challenge which the Church cannot evade. Thus it
is no surprise that the ecumenical forces at Oxford
should have recognized the need for a restatement
of the Christian doctrine of man. 2
Hocking approaches the problem by reminding us that we
have always had authorities willing to save us the work of re
search, prepared to settle ex cathedra what human nature is and
ought to become. He also makes reference to a party of revolt
against all authority in the name of what is "natural"�a
revolt which is usually as dogmatic as the authority itself.
In Hocking's opinion the present revolt is more serious in
nature. There is a general spiritual rebellion, a deliberate
philosophic rejection of former belief. In his mind such a
rebellion has some foundation. 3
These three men are all concerned with the problems
centering around the nature of man. We dare not overlook a
concern which finds such backing and support.
For our study of "The Role of Human Nature in The Philoso
phy of Education" the following outline is given as a guide.
I. THE POSITIONS OF MEN
�John S. Brubacher, Modern Philosophies of Education (New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1950), p. 42.
'H. Shelton Smith, Faith and Nurture(Nevf York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1941), p. 67.
William Ernest Hocking, Human Nature and its Remaking{New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1923), pp. viii, ix.
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II. THE PROBLEMS OF MAGNITUDE
III. THE PROGRAM OF MEDIATION
I. THE POSITIONS OF MEN
In the selection of men who have shaped theological thought,
past and present, the right of individual personal opinion should
be respected. Some men might be considered in connection
with theologians or with the educational philosophers, for their
work has had a marked bearing in both fields . In the study of
human nature there are some men who must be included in
even a hurried survey.
The Apostle Paul no doubt heads the list of this world's wit
nesses to the belief that man has fallen and human nature is
depraved. His teaching relative to this is clearly given in the
Epistle to the Romans.'* Reinhold Niebuhr makes reference to
Romans in support of original sin. The influence of Paul's
thought upon succeeding generations is very great.
Augustine's view of sin and gracewas influenced by his early
religious experiences and by his opposition to Pelagius, but
his view was primarily determined by his careful study of the
Epistle to the Romans. As a result of the entrance of sin into
the world man is unable to do the true good; man sinks deeper
and deeper into bondage. Man longs for God, but he can do
little to change his status before God. Augustine did not look
upon sin as something positive, but as a negation or privation.
It is not something evil added to man; it is a privation of good. ^
What Did The Theologians Say ?
The radical view of Augustine as it pertains to individual
man and his descendants is set forth in the following quotation:
Through the organic connection between Adam and
his descendants, the former transmits his fallen
nature, with the guilt and corruption attaching to it,
to his posterity. Augustine conceives of the unity of
the human race, not federally, but realistically.
'*Some of the principal references in Romans used to support
the view that men are naturally depraved are e.g. , 5:12, 14,
17: 6:12, and 7:17-24.
^L. Berkhof, The History of Christian Doctrines (fjYSind. Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1949), pp. 137-138.
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The whole human race was germinally present in the
first man, and therefore also actually sinned in
him... And therefore the sin of human nature was
the sin of all its individualizations. As a result of
sin man is totally depraved and unable to do any
spiritual good. Augustine does not deny that the
will still has a certain natural freedom. .. .At the
same time he maintains that man, separated from
God, burdened with guilt, and under the dominion of
evil, cannot will that which is good in the sight of
God. 6
The outstanding leaders of the Church have advocated the
most practical part of Augustinian anthropology- We see his
influence especially in the New England theology which we will
consider briefly in the following pages . The great bearing of
such a position and practice upon education is at once apparent.
Augustinianism had its opponent from the beginning in the
person of Pelagius who advocated an a-moral view of human
nature. He differed with Augustine regarding the questions of
free will and original sin. According to Pelagius, Adam, as
he came from the hand of God, was not endowed with positive
holiness. His original condition was one of neutrality; he was
neither holy nor sinful, but he had a capacity for both good and
evil. He could choose either one of these alternatives. Adam
chose sin, but his fall in sin harmed no one but himself. For
Pelagius there was no hereditary transmission of a sinful
nature or of guilt, and consequently no such doctrine as original
sin. Man's nature is not possessed of evil tendencies and de
sires which inevitably cause him to sin. Man need not sin; sin
is caused by wrong education and bad example.^
This is basically the teaching of theSocinians and Unitarians .
Adam's sin affected only himself; man is created by God, and
created as an innocent being. God imputes to men only those
acts which they personally and consciously perform. Adam's
sin was only a bad example. ^ An additional word pertaining to
Socinianism and its bearing upon educational theory is quoted
from Berkhof.
^Ibid.,p. 139.
'^Ibid., pp. 136-137.
^Henry Clarence Thiessen, Introductory Lectures in Systematic
Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1949), p. 260.
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Men are even now by nature like Adam in that they
have no proneness or tendency to sin, but are placed
in somewhat more unfavorable circumstances be
cause of the examples of sin which they see and of
which they hear. While this increases their chances
of falling into sin, they can avoid sin altogether, and
some of them actually do. And even if they do fall
in sin and are thus guilty of transgression, they do
not therefore incur the divine wrath. . . . They need
no Saviour nor any extraordinary interposition of
God to secure their salvation. No change in their
moral nature is required, and no provision for
effecting such a change was made. However, the
teachings and example of Christ are helpful in leading
them in the right direction.^
The import and bearing of such a theory on education is
easily seen. Such a position causes the one believing it to have
large confidence in man. If sin is caused by bad example, men
will work to eliminate the evils of society. The social emphasis
growing out of such a theory is apparent.
The view of Rousseau is representative of the natural good
ness of man. While he is not considered a theologian this view
is the one advocated by many liberals. We will consider the
views of Rousseau in greater detail in connection with the
educational philosophers. The view of the natural goodness of
man is mentioned here to complete the three main views
relative to human nature. The belief that man is naturally
good was a later development than the views of Augustine and
Pelagius. The view which dominated education in America was
the Augustinian, generally known as Calvinism. This view is
referred to as "The New England Theology."
The character and place of Calvinism in early America are
summarized by Fleming in the book Children and Puritanism .
During the period 1620-1847 there was a large measure of
uniformity in theology. Though modifications of early
Calvinism took place, the resulting theology was still
Calvinism. Total depravity was included in the "Five Points
of Calvinism" set forth at the Synod of Dort in 1618. The
sovereignty of God, the divine decrees, and the inability of
sinful man were important aspects of Calvinism. These views
^Berkhof, op. cit. , pp. 154-155.
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caused many to lean toward fatalism. Such views were not
merely in the background of men's thoughts, for such formed
the overt basis for the preaching of the day.^^
The Calvinistic system was taught, improved and preached,
for a century and a half. Its influence upon the religious and
educational life of New England during this period was signifi
cant. Great stress was placed upon revivals and conversion.
Man was held to be a sinful creature who stood in need of divine
grace resulting in salvation.H
In the opinion of the writer the Arminian system of theology
does not fall entirely within any of the three views considered
above. The Arminian theology teaches that man is sinful, but
he is not thereby rendered a helpless creature. Man is able
to make some response to God. The position of Arminianism
is seen in the following quotation.
Arminius, a disciple of Beza, and at first a strict
Calvinist, became a convert to the doctrine of uni
versal grace and free will. He denied the decree of
reprobation and toned down the doctrine of original
sin. His successor at Leyden, Episcopius, and
his other followers, such as Uytenboga^rt, Grotius,
Limborch, and others, departed still farther from
the accepted doctrine of the Church, and finally em
bodied their views in a remonstrance, consisting of
five articles. 12
The opponents of Arminianism, in the person of Calvinists,
have viewed this position as semi-Pelagianism. The position
held relative to guilt, original sin, and total depravity, is such
that Calvinists believe the system is nearer Pelagianism than
Calvinism. 13 Dr. Thiessen reaches the same conclusion in
his presentation of the Arminian theology- 1^
The view of human nature held by Quakers is worthy of brief
consideration. For early Quakers the Scriptures were sub
ordinate to the inward light. Man was looked upon as sinful
l^Sanford Fleming, Children and Puritanism {New B-aven: Yale
University Press, 1933), pp. 48-56.
llVergilius Ferm, editor, An Encyclopedia of Religion (New York:
The Philosophical Library, 1945), pp. 527-528.
12Berkhof, op. cit. , p. 155.
13/^/^.
14Thiessen, op. cit. , p. 261.
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and unclean by nature, however, the term "original sin" was
rejected. 1^ Quakers, or Friends as they are called today, are
divided into at least three distinct bodies . The orthodox group
has adopted much of the theological terminology of other re
ligious bodies. William P. Pinkham, an orthodox Friend,
well received by his group, has written the following on the
subject of "total depravity."
The Society of Friends, and some other evangeli
cal Christians discard the term 'total depravity, ' not
because it does not properly express the hopeless,
helpless state of the sinner, when considered apart
from the blessings of redemption; for the term is no
stronger than the statements of Scripture fully
warrant; but because those who use the term apply
(or seem to apply it) to persons in whom some of
the influences of grace are yet efficient. Any such
application is unjust toward God.^^
It seems to the writer that the note of warning or admonition
given in the above quotation is important in the view of human
nature. Any view which casts reflection on the ability of man
or the goodness of God has grave implications for both theology
and education.
This review of the theological position held by different men
or movements regarding human nature serves to remind us of
the problems involved. It is imperative that a clearer and
more general theory of human nature is necessary for the
teacher. We now turn our attention to some educational
philosophers to see what they have to offer us in the hope of an
answer .
What Do Educational Philosophers Sav?
rne tirst man to claim our attention is Rousseau. He is
listed with the educational philosophers in this paper because
his view of human nature runs counter to the prevailing theo
logical view considered above. Rousseau was at war with the
society of his day. The education which he recommends for
l^E. H. Klotsche, Christian Symbolics (Burlington, Iowa: The
Lutheran Literary Board, 1929), pp. 290-296.
ISwilliam P. Pir]kham, The Lamb of God,Third edition (Los
Angeles: Goerge Rice & Sons, 1916), pp. 187-188.
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Emile is intended to equip him against the distortion of his
nature by society. It was Rousseau's objective to bring edu
cation into harmony with laws of nature governing the progress
and life of the individual. As mentioned previously in this
paper, Rousseau was opposed to the view that human nature is
evil and must be changed or disciplined. He believed that it is
good and that no hindrance should be placed upon the freedom
of its development. It is necessary that the teacher recognize
this and that she seek to understand child nature.
The views of Horace Bushnell are very important since he
did a great deal to shape theological thought and educational
policy relative to human nature. Following graduation from
divinity school he became pastor of the North Church in Hart
ford. His influence is seen in the following statement.
DeanWeigle states that his workmarks the passing
of extreme Calvinism in the New England Churches.
Foster declares that he was the most important
writer of the later New Haven theology.
However, Bushnell was not chiefly a theologian; his main con
tributions were made as a preacher and a pastor. From the
store of his own spiritual experience he endeavored to guide
the churches intobetter ways of thinking and improved methods
of presenting the Christian faith.
Bushnell' s work may be divided in two aspects though they
are not opposed to each other. The first is his view of the
revival method. In a sense he rebelled against revivals as the
only or the dominant method. In 1838 his article entitled
"Spiritual Economy of Revivals of Religion" appeared in the
Quarterly Christian Spectator. In it he does not condemn re
vivals totally. He recognizes the value of such spiritual
quickenings, but feels the abuses associated with them should
be corrected. Revivals have a place in God's plan; God may
act periodically in renewing men. God need not act uniformly
all the time, nor need He be limited to the revival method.
Bushnell believed there was a negative side to revivals. Not
all influences coming from revival are good; errors and ex
travagances frequently accompany them. The following
quotation expresses his view relative to the negative side of
17 James Mulhern, A History ofEducation (New York: The Ronald
Press Company, 1946), pp. 347-348.
l^Fleming, op. cit., p. 195.
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revivals:
Four errors are discussed: first, the supposition
that the revival mood should be constant; secondly,
the feeling that to accomplish anything in religion
something unusual must be employed; thirdly, the
overemphasis upon conversion; and fourthly, the
failure to recognize the advantages to be gained by
the Church in times ofnon-revival , particularly with
1 Q
respect to Christian nurture.
^
Though he was not opposed to the revival method as such; he
was opposed to the extravagances connected with it and the
doctrinal views of many supporting revivals. His discussion
of revivals was the point of departure for his stressing of
Christian nurture. This brings us to the second aspect of his
work, namely, his developing within the churches a proper
place for children. He viewed the non-revival period as a good
time for Christian nurture. He clearly expressed himself
relative to the principle of development underlying Christian
nurture.
What was the position of Bushnell relative to the doctrine of
depravity? The following statement speaks to this question:
Stress is laid upon the fact that the doctrine of
growth is not an infringement upon the doctrine of
depravity. 'It only declares that depravity is best
rectified when it is weakest, and before it is
stiffened into habit.' The criticism that such a
view rules out the divine agency is emphatically
denied. 'Whatsoever the parent does for his child,
is to have its effect by a divine influence. And it is
the pledge of this, which lies at the basis of the
household covenant, and constitutes its power. '20
However, Bushnell's view of the home, Christian nurture,
and Christian education was such that little stress was placed
upon the sin of man. In fact his thesis was "that the child is
to grow up a Christian." The child is not to grow up in sin,
as was commonly believed, and in later years be converted.
The child may love the good from his earliest years. The
parents and life in the home are vitally important in the for
mation of proper habits .
'^^Ibid., p. 197.
mbid,, p. 198.
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Bushnell's position was a definite departure from the thought
and practices of his time. There was great stress upon re
vival in New England, and it was commonly believed that the
childmust grow up in sin. The Church gave only a small place
to the importance of children. Bushnell reacted against this.
It is generally accepted thatBushnell's Christian Nuture was an
epoch-making book. It dealt a hard blow to the old Puritan
theology of America. It marked not only a turning point in the
importance of the child in the churches; it also marked a new
epoch in the history of religious education. ^1
The view of George Albert Coe was a powerful force in the
shaping of educational thought and practice relative to a theory
of human nature. Coe was a follower of John Dewey's doctrine
of the "New Education." Coe's view of divine immanence was
such that he believed spiritual values are inherent in every
aspect of the common life. He made a complete break with the
idea of total depravity. He believed in a progress-making
God.^^ In his book A Social Theory of Religious Education he con
siders the following subjects: the instincts, sin, human nature,
and depravity. He reminds us that it is necessary to consider
the nature of the human material that religious education seeks
to modify. Is there any reason to believe that children will
make favorable response to the principles taught? Does human
nature include any obstacle to such a response? We must dis
cover what capacities people have for being interested in
higher ideals and better living. Coe believes that a child's
religious progress evidences the continuous achievement of
intelligent good will in his growing social relationships. ^3
The use of the term "instincts" is used freely by Coe in this
book; his view is briefly presented. Some of the instincts, for
example rivalry, anger and pugnacity, may be misused and
abused. However, they are not basically sinful or carnal;there
are numerous good uses to which these instincts may be put.
Some instincts must be suppressed or controlled. Rivalry and
greed oftentimes get out of hand. Likewise, instinctive
p. 207.
22Arnold S. Nash, editor, Protestant Thought in the Twentieth
Century (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1951),
DD. 229-240.
^^George Albert Coe, ASocialTheoryofReligiousEducation (New
York: Scribner's, 1919), pp. 119-120.
50 Asbury Seminarian
mastery and submission appear to be at least needless, and
many times a hindrance to the growth of society toward de
mocracy. The need of society is cooperation. The individuals
composing society stand in need of training. Greater clarity
is needed between what is instinctive and what is acquired.
Coe expresses himself in the following words:
How often do we hear it said of one child that he
is 'naturally' amiable, and of another that he is
'naturally' self-willed, the implication of 'naturally'
being that the quality in question is a matter of
original endowment, and therefore unchangeable. . . .
Children's dispositions are complexes of what is
nature and what is acquired. The acquired part is
the habits whereby certain impulses, specialized
by experience, are given a permanent and specific
direction, while other native impulses, unused or
repressed, remain in the background, or decrease
toward complete atrophy.
What is meant by the term "human nature" ? It is insufficient
to merely recognize that the instincts are hereditary, per
manent, and fundamental to character. Each instinct has many
possible modes of expression that vary through a large scale.
Habit forming is also human nature, and that itmakes possible
the fixing in human life of either better or worse instinctive
ways. It is necessary to become a self-criticising self, and
to form self-criticising societies. Such is a means of im
provement and advancement. Coe believes, as did Bushnell,
that the child may grow up a Christian and never know himself
as being otherwise. If this is to happen the home and society
must function on the Christian plane . It is a recognized fact
that antisocial instincts are active in the early years as well
as socially constructive ones. Both types of instincts
are functioning in early childhood. There is a greatdifference
between childhood and maturity, but the difference does not
constitute a moral break. In order for a child to attain
Christian maturity he should intelligently exercise certain
impulses of childhood itself. Some maintain that childhood is
egoistic, and that it is necessary to postpone certain endeavor
until adolescence. If this position be accepted, we would need
24/^/</., pp. 122-133.
25/^/^., p. 133.
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to delay religious education until the period of adolesence.
Motives would continue to grow which must later be counter
acted. ^6
Not only must habit forming still go on; the whole
of it will be affected by preadolescent social ex
perience. Nothing occurs that can at a stroke wipe
old selfish habits off the slate.
Coe states his position relative to sin in the following
quotation. The view expressed is far removed from the New
England Theology.
'Sin' is a social conception. When I was a boy I
was taught that sin is a relation, not between me and
my neighbor, but between me and God. Subsequent
reflection has led me to regard the distinction here
made as not valid. The intimacy of the two Great
Commandments to each other is too close. The
dwelling place of the Highest is not apart from, but
within, the brotherhood, which is the family of God
and the kingdom of God. I find neither psychological,
nor ethical, nor metaphysical footing for the idea
that I can have relations with God in which he and I
are isolated from all society. My very being as a
conscious individual is bound up with that of my
fellows; a divine judgment upon what I am and upon
what I will to be is per se a judgment upon my re
ciprocal human relationships. Nor can I judge God
otherwise. The only meaning that I can give to his
supreme goodness, the only ground that I can assign
for bowing my will to his, is that he enters into the
human social process more fully, more con
structively, than I do. The need for any such term
as sin lies in the fact that we men, in addition to
constructing the human society in which God and
men are both sharers, also obstruct it and in some
measure destroy. We must now as educators face
the fact that we do, individually and collectively,
oppose, resist, and undo our own work of social
upbuilding. 28
26/^^^., pp. 135-148.
27/^/^., p. 161.
2Slbid,,p. 164.
52 Asbury Seminarian
The transmission of sin brings to life the old controversy
relative to total depravity- The position taken by most re
ligious educators and the interpretation given by them is far
different from that of the early New England theologian. In
early America total depravity was a dogmatic belief; the
authority for sucha convictionwas based upon divine revelation.
The conduct of children was not studied, but the method con
sisted in contrasting children's conduct with a fixed standard
of adulter even divine perfection, and then taking all deviation
from the standard as defects of child nature. It was apriori
procedure; a conclusion being first accepted, and facts were
then used to illustrate and confirm it. The entire picture is
held to be changed when we approach the facts in the spirit of
science. There are many reactions in children which are
social in a similar manner that some of our maturest Christian
conduct is social. Other reactions may be noted that are anti
social in the same sense that some of our mature badness is
anti-social. We observe and must keep in mind that children
are not adults. The actions of children are not simple, as the
theory of depravity makes them out to be. Children are not
"good" or "bad, " but they have complex personalities because
of the influence of preceding experiences as well as the numer
ous instincts that are always at work. If these complex per
sonalities are to be understood, conduct must be analyzed into
its various elements. The relation of these elements one to
the other must be noted, and the particular stimulus which
awakens each of them on each occasion should be determined,
if possible. We may discover that much of the faulty conduct
is an imitation of the conduct of others . Poor conduct may be
the result of habit. 29
Even though the cause of a child's misconduct may be traced
to his elders, the misconduct is his own and he needs to be
freed from it. The task of the teacher is to see that childish
faults, whatever their cause, are dealt with in a manner which
will leave a socially constructive deposit. The position that a
child is not "really bad" does not mean that he should be let
alone. In some instances the wisest plan is to overlook the
child's misconduct. But in most instances the child should
realize that something iswrong, and that it should be corrected.
The educator should work for continuous moral growth rather
29/^,^., pp. 168-170.
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than relying upon any breaks provided by original nature.
Moral growth does not occur at the same rate at all times.
Moral growth may be characterized by crises at times . Such
experiences are not uncommon during adolescence. However,
it is a mistake to postpone the beginning of personal religion
until adolescence, hoping for a conversion experience that will
produce new character. Elementary religious education
should make a conversion experience unnecessary.
Hocking's view, as set forth in Human Nature and its Remaking,
is typified in the following quotation:
For all agencies which are now engaged in re
making mankind, three questions have become vital.
What is original human nature? What do we wishto
make of it? How far is it possible to make of it
what we wish?30
All social enterprises recognize that human nature is a
problem. However, human nature is plastic, and heredity by
no means determines man's destiny. Human nature is capable
ofmodifying itself. Naturalism and liberalism have endeavored
to set human nature free. An attempt has been made to set up
a thorough and literal inventory of all the ingredients of human
nature, and all the instincts that are to be satisfied. It has
been discovered that certain propensities can hardly be ap
peased without being allowed to assume control of the other
propensities. It appears that some elements of human nature
can only be liberated by discipline. It is no longer a question
between discipline and liberation, it is a question as to what
kind of discipline a free man will have. There are many
things which we do not want to do relative to human nature.
We do not want to suppress or do away with our primitive
passions; they are to continue with us. We do not want to en
gage in a persistent struggle against them, or follow any course
which results in moral tension. If human nature is to change
at all, it should be in ways that will leave it more completely
satisfied. ^1
We can never draw a line between what is natural and what
is artificial in man. No example of the unaffected natural state
can be foimd, for with the first social exchange the original
self is overlaid. The concept of our original nature is always
30Hocking, op. cit., p. 11.
31/^/^., pp. 34-40.
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an abstraction.
Many people today reject the argument: if a man sins, he
is a sinner. The man having committed sin may have been
imder severe strain or depression. We discover that the dis
tribution of blame is a difficult problem. If a man does wrong
today, we often conclude that he is in the wrong place. If
such a man is located in the right place and given the proper
type of work, he is likely to do the right. However, Hocking
feels that we cannot follow Augustine in his dark picture of
sin, but the modern attitude which omits sin altogether is not
the correct view either. ^2 But there is nothing in original
human nature which taken by itself can be called evil. The
following quotation from Hocking casts a ray of light upon this
statement.
Admitting, then, that no crude impulse is sinful
taken by itself, it does not in the least follow that
crude impulses as we find them inhuman nature are
therefore good. It does not so much as follow (as is
often stated) that they are devoid of moral quality.
For as we find them in human nature, no impulse is
by itself. The moral quality of any impulse is due
somehow to its mental environment, not to its own
intrinsic quality; but every impulse (after the Itypo-
thetical first) has an environment. . . .Nothing canbe
condenmed because it is crude; but a moral question
may arise at once if an impulse has an opportunity
to be something else than crude. Sin lies, we judge,
in the relation of an impulse to its mental environ
ment. ^3
It appears that no behavior can be defined as sinful by its
descriptive character alone. We may analyze sin and in a
measure describe it, but it is impossible to explain it. If sin
could be explained it would be found to be the invariable con
sequence of certain conditions; and whatever is necessary is
not sin. Sin implies that kind of freedom in which the fate and
character of every conscious act comes for a moment under
the control of "self." Moral mistakes appear to be similar to
the mistakes which accompany the learning of any new art.
The following explanation is given by Dr. Hocking. One may
-^"^ Ibid., pp. 126-127.
^^Ibid., pp, 138-139.
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safely predict that the beginner at target practice will miss
the mark. Thebeginner is free to hit the mark and there is no
reason why he must miss it. As time progresses he will hit
the mark more often, and a curve of his progress in learning
can be drawn. Is sin a missing of the mark, and therefore a
phenomenon of the curve of learning? In the matter of target
practice the full will of the individual is on the side of hitting
the mark, and it is the physical obstacles of imperfect organi
zation and control which cause defeat. However, in moral
effort there is no difficulty of this kind, for the nature of right
is to be always within reach, otherwise there would be no
obligation. The real point is that the man's complete will is
not on the side of hitting the mark. Hence the analogy breaks
down; and there is no law of learning for morality. Morally
speaking the mark might have been hit. Sin so considered
leaves place for original sin; every man is his own Adam.
Sin to be sure has its consequences, both social and psycho
logical. 34
The view of H. Shelton Smith relative to sin and human
nature will now be considered from his book Faith and Nurture.
While Smith's view is far removed from the position coming
from Augustine, he takes strong exception to the naturalistic
position of Coe and Dewey. He feels that the thought-patterns
of liberal Protestant nurture need revision; he also recognizes
that the newer trends in theological thought are defective in
certain respects. Both modes of thought are in need of restudy
and criticism. The liberal church lacks a realistic under
standing of man. This is caused in part by the fact that the
liberal theory of religious nurture has been controlled by the
sciences of psychology, sociology, and anthropology. Man
must also be studied from the Christian point of view, for man
can be understood only from the divine perspective. The
sciences mentioned above are helpful but inadequate by them
selves. According to Smith man is a creature of God, there
fore the naturalistic view held by Dewey and his followers is a
hopeless attempt to understand man in the light of the empirical
perspective alone. Religious orthodoxy has failed to see man
in his empirical perspective; however, human value is en
hancedwhen it is connected with a transcendent source in God.
Secular humanists take exception to such a view.
34/^,;^., pp. 150-161.
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Smith holds that the educational theory of the liberal Church
is still controlled by a romantic doctrine of man. The nature
of human nature is a problem which the modern religious edu
cator must concern himself. 35
Time and space make it impossible to consider the views of
such educators as William C. Bower, John Dewey, J. Donald
Butler, Paul H. Vieth and Ernest J. Chave. However, those
considered leave us with a sense of disappointment similar to
the disappointment with many of the theologians . It is hoped
that the concern represented by both groups may result in a
better understanding of human nature.
n. THE PROBLEMS OF MAGNITUDE
It seems to the writer that both theologians and philosophers
fail to consider and appreciate the religious background,
cultural situation, and economic condition of men disagreeing
with them. This ought to be noted in connection with Augustine .
His view of sin and grace was molded to a certain degree by his
deep religious experiences, in which he went through great
spiritual struggles and eventually came to his view of the Gospel .
In his Confessions we read of his immorality and lack of interest
in religion, and how he sought escape in Manichaeism and al
most fell into its snares, but at last turned to Christ. Some
believe there are traces of a Manichaean influence in his
gloomy view of human nature as fundamentally evil, and in his
denial of the freedom of the will. It is more likely that this
resulted from his own sense of inherent evil and spiritual
bondage . 36
Three important points claim our attention relative to
Bushnell's religious development. He was not reared under
the influence of the hyper-Calvinism of his day. His parents
were religious people, but his father was a Methodist and his
mother an Episcopalian. His escape from New England
Calvinism is not to be overlooked in the development of his
thought. Obviously his early religious experiences were differ
ent from those of many youth in the New England churches.
Calvinism never gained the deep hold upon him which was
characteristic of the day. The atmosphere of the home
counteracted the prevailing Calvinistic thought of the day.
35shelton, �V.,pp. 67-99.
36Berkhof, op. cif.,p. 135.
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It is also important to note that Bushnell was "a child of
Christian nurture." His parents were fair, unselfish,
thoughtful, characterized by love and devotion, and consci
entiousness. In later years Bushnell recognized the bearing
of his early training upon his own thought and life . The nurture
which he advocated and presented to the church was a nurture
which he had experienced.
Mention should be made of his deeper religious experience
coming to him through a revival. What was the influence of
revival in the theology of Bushnell? He had previously passed
through a period of skepticism resulting in a spiritual decline.
He always considered this revival experience as a very im
portant crisis in his life. It is often referred to as his con
version. ^7
No doubt similar evidence could be found to show how past
experiences made and molded other men considered earlier in
this paper. It is worthy of notice that liberalism came into
being in full force in America at a time of prosperity, while
neo-orthodoxy took root in Europe at a time when men suffered
hardship. The neo-orthodox movement gained a hearing in
America at a time when the idea of "natural goodness" was
severely tested by World War I. This all proves, at least to
many, that men have never been quite as objective as one
could desire.
Another problem of magnitude centers around the rules of
interpretation often used when interpreting the Bible or the
findings of science. A few scholars are presently coming to
realize this in their approach to the Bible. Bernard Ramm is
a good representative of this group. He believes in the creative
work of God and the sinfulness of man. However, he feels that
those presenting the orthodox faith have often been guilty of
overstating their case. They have said too much about the
"when" and the "how" of creation. Ussher's chronology can no
longer be accepted. Man is much older and the antiquity of the
human race is of little real concern to the Christian view. He
confesses that science has proven the human race to be very
old. Science is sometimes guilty of discrediting the con
clusions of the theologians too quickly. Because certain mis
takes have been made it does not logically follow that truth is
never discovered and stated. Scientists need to make a dis-
37Fleming, c//.,pp. 192-195.
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tinction between their findings and their interpretations of the
findings. Presuppositions, in so far as possible, should
be laid aside. ^8
There is some reason to believe that there is greater
recognition of these problems today than formerly. Some
theologians and educators are endeavoring to understand each
other, and some men are making themselves heard in each
field.
III. THE PROBLEM OF MEDIATION
Brevity must also characterize our consideration of this
point of mediation. In the book Protestant Thought in the Tiventieth
Century, Shelton Smith, in the chapter "Christian Education,"
states that progressives have three courses of action open to
them. The first course is to continue to reaffirm their already
established theological convictions. Smith says this was the
choice of George A. Coe, William C. Bower, and the late
Harrisons. Elliott. Such an emphasis will continue to serve as
a counterweight against the extreme types of Protestant ortho
doxy as Barthianism. Such service is important, because
ultra-orthodoxy imperils a vital doctrine of Christian nurture.
A second alternative for progressive educators would be to
align themselves with metaphysical naturalism and abandon
the Christian tradition entirely. This course has been im
plicit in much of the thought of the left-wing educational
liberals who have adopted an extreme functionalistic view of
religion. Such a trend is presented by Ernest S. Chave in his
book, A Functional Approach to Religious Education. If religious
educators built their philosophy around this there would be no
conflict between religious education and progressive secular
education. Religious education could make very little con
tribution if this course were followed. The third course open
to educational progressives is to reconstruct their theological
foimdations in the lightof the more realistic insights of current
Christian faith. Smith believes this is the course to be
followed. Many Christian educators are coming to realize that
left-wing Protestant liberalism is no longer the powerful in
fluence of the past. Religious educators are coming to hold a
^^Bernard Ramm, The Christian View of Science and Scripture,
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1955), pp. 305-344.
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less optimistic view of human nature. Man "is a child of Grod"
and "is also a fallen creature." "The nature and special con
tent of the Christian revelation, including the centrality of
Christ and his Church" has received a new recognition. 39
William Hordern in his recent book A Laymen's Guide to
Protestant Theology presents a view worthy of notice. He re
jects the idea that theologically speaking, a man has to be a
fundamentalist, liberal, or neo-orthodox. He states that many
theologians are seeking a way between the extremes. He refers
to this as the mediating school, or a movement known as
"modern orthodoxy." The heart of this movement expresses
loyalty to the faith of historic orthodoxy. The other groups
represent deviations to the right or left of orthodojg^."*� it
seems imnecessary to discuss Hordern's view in this paper,
for it is not the purpose of the writer to approve or condemn
his view. Reference is only made to it in an endeavor to show
that some men are looking for a theological structure in which
more men may live together. Whether Hordern is laying the
foundation for such a theological house remains to be seen.
Once he, or someone else, builds such a house we hope and
believe thatmany theologians and educatorswill pay him a visit.
The problem of human nature presents great and grave
problems for both theologian and philosopher. The naturalist
laboring in either field fails by advocating that man can save
himself. The supernaturalist, at least of the extreme
Calvinistic type, fails by leaving the plan of salvation entirely
up to God. While the Apostle Paul has raised many problems
for us, and hyper-orthodoxy has always claimed to find
support in his writings, it may be that Paul answers the
problem relative to human nature and man's salvation in
Philippians 2:12-13.
...work out your own salvation with fear and
trembling [Man's part]. For it is Godwhichworketh
in you both to will and to do of his good pleasure
[God's part].
39Nash, op. cit,, pp. 242-246.
40William Hordern, A Laymen's Guide to Protestant Theology
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1955), pp. 185-209.
